Some of the reasons behind this need lie in the fact that basic domestic jurisdiction rules call for the determination of liability in proceedings before the courts which are closest to the place where the facts have occurred. In the case of non-contractual liability and torts -most HRs violations by MNCs may be classified as such-, this is also the place where the alleged victims and the evidence are to be found. It is the place, too, whose courts should hear the case and whose domestic laws should be applied to the merits, according to the expectations of all the parties involved.
"Extraterritorial remedies" such as universal jurisdiction statutes, the Alien Tort Claims Act / Alien Tort Statute (ATCA / ATS) or similar legislation may be good complements for local court systems and do have certain benefits, because bringing the case to the country of the defendant may provide easier ways to finance the litigation, greater access to discovery, much higher compensatory damages, etc. Still, they are not a definitive solution. It may even be counterproductive, for the purposes of development, to give too much access to litigation venues in Europe and North America because, that way, there may be fewer incentives for the improvement of local judicial and legal systems and for the enforceability of other local judicial and extra-judicial systems such as arbitration, mediation and other kinds of grievance mechanisms.
The usefulness of private justice in this context was already acknowledged by Bernardo Cremades (cited by McCallion), an expert practitioner in the field of international commercial and investment arbitration:
The tortured procedural history of the Bhopal litigation demonstrates the need for an effective international dispute resolution tribunal, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration, to resolve mass tort disaster claims in an efficient and expeditious manner. The US legal system, even with the broad jurisdictional provisions of the Alien Tort Claims Act […] cannot fully obviate the need for an international tribunal where the merits of a case can be directly addressed without the extended procedural manoeuvring and forum non conveniens analysis. 4
In addition to the above, the subsidiarity principle -which purports that governments should only carry out activities to the extent that inferior societal entities are unable to 4 
McCallion, K. F. Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims Litigation and Settlement: The
Exxon Valdez and Bhopal Gas Disaster Cases. In The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.) Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims Settlement Systems. The Hague. Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 43-58. do it properly-may also imply that states have a duty to widely acknowledge the adjudicating capacities of non-state actors, in the same way that some national constitutions contemplate the participation of citizens in the Judicial Power, 5 via trials by jury or similarly to the way that out of court settlements are usually allowed and even encouraged by the State.
Furthermore, there is a clear relationship between the rule of law and economic development as it is indicated, for instance, by the efforts made by the European Union in order to foster judicial cooperation on the basis of the protection of the principle of due process, which in turn would protect and promote the economic European Internal
Market. 6 Beyond HRs violations in developing countries, a good court system and a good out-of-court dispute resolution and settlement system are key to achieving justice and order in society which is, in turn, basic for economic growth.
This paper tries to find out the characteristics that state and (above all) non-state dispute resolution mechanisms should have in order to be effective redress tools vis à vis violations of HRs by MNCs. The paper will first address the right to remedy under international law, i.e. what does international law say about state based and non-state based dispute resolution mechanisms. Then it will address the right to remedy under the United Nations Guiding Principles, a form of soft law which is still receiving much attention and which focuses specifically on violations of HRs by the private sector.
Within the GPs, state and non-state, judicial and non-judicial mechanisms will be studied. Finally, an answer will be given to the question of whether arbitration and mediation -two classic commercial dispute resolution mechanisms-can be effective grievance mechanisms, i.e. non-judicial mechanisms for the resolution of human rights conflicts in the business context.
II. The right to remedy in International Law
As it has been mentioned above, 
State-based judicial mechanisms
The GPs devote GP 26 to the effectiveness of State-based judicial mechanisms. Such effectiveness should accordingly be studied from the point of view of access to the mechanism, from the point of view of procedure and from the point of view of the outcome of the proceedings. Although the ideal characteristics of these mechanisms, as
described by GP 26, should be in connection to all three aspects of the mechanisms Other characteristics of State based judicial mechanisms, in accordance with GP 26 are impartiality, integrity, ability to protect due process and to protect HRs defenders.
Impartiality is such a necessary factor of a judicial mechanism that it is the only one measured by the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum).
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Whereas independence makes reference to the fact that the adjudicator is not "chained"
8 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf to any other person or institution that may impair its ability to decide on fair grounds (absence of corruption would be a similar characteristic), impartiality is a subjective quality that makes reference to the lack of prejudices. Due process is generally understood to be a procedural fundamental right which has to do with the ability to accord a fair hearing and allow parties to present their case. Finally, the need to protect
HRs defenders as part of the mechanism is perceived as more and more necessary, especially because, in HRs litigation in developing countries, victims are many times illiterate and helpless and NGOs must assist them to have access to justice.
Which are the key elements for a suitable and modern dispute resolution system, necessary for the adjudication of human rights disputes against MNCs?
Notwithstanding traditional and native grievance mechanisms, which have to be used and integrated into a broader dispute resolution system, we may partly make use of the ten year long Council of Europe research work which has so far produced four reports on the state of European judicial (court) systems. The reports also show a correlation between the budget devoted to the court system and the quality of such system. Therefore, it might be reasonable for international bodies to pay attention to the amount of international aid that is devoted to this area. 
State-based non judicial mechanisms
As to State-based non judicial mechanisms, GP 27 states that they might be administrative, legislative, mediation based, adjudicative (so arbitration might be included) or a combination of the above. Furthermore, National HRs institutions should also play a role. Non-State based mechanisms, described in GP 28 also comprise adjudicative (again, arbitration might be a possibility) or dialogue based (mediation/conciliation), with the intervention of Regional and International HRs bodies. The advantages that GP 28 observes in this type of mechanisms are speed, reduced costs and transnational reach. Speed and reduced costs are achieved through the prohibition of appeal. Transnational reach is based upon the fact that ADR mechanisms are based upon consent, not upon jurisdiction rules, as will be explained later.
GP 29 imposes an obligation upon businesses to participate in grievance mechanisms.
This obligation, like all other obligations contained in the GPs can only be either an obligation established by national law or a social expectation (i.e. not an international obligation). The obligation could also be based on commitments by businesses, like those contained in Global framework agreements (e.g. the Global compact), Multistakeholder agreements or codes of conduct.
Non-State non-judicial mechanisms
As it has been said, this paper also deals with the characteristics that non-State based non-judicial mechanisms must have in order to fulfil the standards set by the GPs. These principles do not mention arbitration specifically, in the same way that they do in fact mention mediation, but they seem to be have in mind both Alternative Dispute Finally, the GPs make a list of effectiveness criteria for non-State non-judicial mechanisms which is far more detailed than those lists of features displayed for other types of mechanisms. The reason may be that the GPs believe that, for instance, judicial mechanisms are sufficiently well known, whereas grievance mechanisms and their advantages are not. Legitimacy, the first feature for effectiveness, rests upon trust and accountability, i.e. in order to be legitimate, a grievance mechanism must have been either chosen by the parties to the dispute or must be trusted by them for other reasons.
Accessibility deals with the fact that the grievance mechanism must be well known to users, must provide assistance to users, must be language friendly, must not be expensive, must be well located, and participation in it must not raise fears of reprisal, which goes beyond the simple organisation of the mechanism. Predictability should be achieved through a well known procedure, an indicative timeframe, clarity and means of monitoring implementation. Equitable means that there must be access to information (evidence is, many times, one of the most difficult problems for claimants in HRs litigation), legal advice and expertise. Transparency means that there should be confidentiality and, at the same time, information about progress and performance.
Confidentiality raises the issue of amicus curiae briefs and interventions which, in other ADR mechanisms such as investment arbitration with HRs implications, have also raised deep concern.
Non-judicial grievance mechanisms should be rights compatible and their outcomes should be in accordance with international HRs law. This is a harder issue than it seems because, although the mechanisms may foresee that a decision in equity is to be issued, such decision should nonetheless respect HRs law.
Finally, as the GPs put it, grievance mechanisms should be a source of learning to allow for constant improvement.
IV. Grievance mechanisms and effective Human Rights enforcement: advantages, disadvantages and problems to be tackled
The GPs hint at an interesting possibility when they state that "State-based judicial and f) Speed and finality: Considering that arbitral awards can only be appealed in very rare circumstances, the usual length of arbitral proceedings is actually less than ordinary court proceedings, which can take years until a decision which cannot be appealed is reached.
g) Less expensive in the long run: Although the private nature of the proceedings makes arbitration costly, the fact that awards cannot be appealed makes the total costs smaller than costly and long litigation proceedings.
Nevertheless, private justice also has its drawbacks and problems in comparison with court litigation.
Consent and jurisdiction

A) Consent mechanisms
Arbitration is based on the voluntary consent and submission of the parties to the jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal. As a rule, commercial arbitrations are commenced on the basis of arbitration clauses inserted into contracts which bind the parties in dispute. Nevertheless, ICSID arbitration, -which may provide a useful model for HRs arbitration, in certain ways-has been labelled "arbitration without privity", 20 in the sense that one of the parties offers its consent in advance (the host State), whereas the investor is allowed to give its own consent later on, usually by way of filing a claim before ICSID (Figure 1 ).
Drawing an analogy with investment arbitration, submissions to arbitration on the part 
State's involvement
Nevertheless, the host and the home country of the MNC would have to be actively involved in the setting up of these mechanisms, in order to obtain the consent of the MNC. As it has been said above, the host and home State of the MNC would have to be willing to include in their BIT a provision which made the consent of the MNC to submit to arbitration a condition precedent for the host State's consent to submit to ICSID arbitration.
Secondly, the home State would have to be willing to grant investment, commercial or zoning permits to MNCs operating within their borders subject to the condition that the MNC grants its advance consent to submit to arbitration. Equally, the home State would have to be willing to insert arbitration clauses for the benefit of third parties (the victims) in the investment contract they agree upon with the MNC. Furthermore, the The incentives for the host State are numerous, to the extent that its workers and population would be more protected, having one more dispute resolution mechanism they can choose from, in addition to domestic courts (in case there is no waiver of jurisdiction before such courts) or in case the advantages of a modern and specialised dispute resolution mechanism outgrow the advantages of a maybe not so efficient or corrupt national court system. Nevertheless, these incentives would have to be bigger than the incentive of the Host State to attract foreign investment, in case it can be proved that an MNC would rather invest in another country which does not force it to submit to arbitration. This would probably have to be ascertained on a case by case basis (i.e. there will be some countries which cannot afford to loose foreign investment in exchange for more HRs protection). There may even be incentives for other host
States not to force MNCs to submit to arbitration, hoping that they relocate their investment to that country. Furthermore, it cannot be ascertained beforehand whether
MNCs would rather move their investments to a country which offers worse profit prospects in exchange for the security that they cannot be brought before an arbitration tribunal or mediation board.
The incentives of the MNC's home State to put in place mechanisms such as the BIT special clauses or the operating licenses may be more difficult to find, given the fact that offering consent to arbitration may place a national corporation under the constant threat of a "lawsuit". In the worst scenario, a national MNC may decide to stop its investment activities abroad, diminishing the State's biggest source of revenue: taxes. Nevertheless, home States, duly pressured by NGOs and international institutions may also put some pressure on their domestic MNCs doing business abroad to submit to arbitration, which would increase their accountability.
C) Incentives for MNC's consent
Irrespective of the host or home country's efforts to force the MNC to give its consent to arbitration or other kind of Grievance Mechanisms, there may be other incentives through which MNCs may be induced to submit to arbitration after the facts giving raise potentially be brought, i.e. USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Japan. Obviously, criminal liability -both before domestic and before international courts-cannot be waived.
D) Advantages of arbitration in the Business & HRs context
Irrespective of concessions made to MNCs in exchange for their consent to arbitration or mediation, the advantages of commercial arbitration over litigation are well known 23 and may serve both to solve many of the technical and practical problems arising out of the abovementioned HRs protection systems and to convince both MNCs and their victims to submit to arbitration. Some of these advantages are:
-The presence of party appointed arbitrators/mediators/conciliators would give the parties confidence that their case would receive the attention it deserves and would 21 Nevertheless, in many cases of HRs violations such as, for instance, those involving environmental harm, where proof of causal nexus is vital, limitations on discovery may be detrimental to justice. 22 facilitate that decisions on the merits are accepted voluntarily. A well balanced tribunal, with jurists and experts from different legal traditions, cultural, professional and economic backgrounds may also be key in disputes that are sometimes presented as part of a global "culture clash" or "class struggle".
-The expertise and prestige of arbitrators in the relevant field may also encourage the parties to submit to private justice mechanisms.
-Neutral territory: Non-legally trained claimants (the victims) may overcome a feeling of unfairness if the proceedings do not take place in the country where the MNC is incorporated.
-Flexibility: Arbitration can be tailored by the parties according to their procedural needs, being able to decide on how many different procedural stages will there be, the extent of discovery, etc, which may increase their confidence in the justice of the final decision and make them more cooperative. As it has been said, although key decisions on the proceedings are taken by the parties, arbitrators are not curtailed by centuries old procedural codes and can help structure the proceedings according to the needs of each particular case. Depending on the nature of the dispute, the proceedings need to be longer or shorter, or must provide for more or less strict standards of proof, discovery rules or cross examination of witnesses. Finally, court litigation does not, in many countries, avail itself of the IT resources which enable a much more efficient handling of the proceedings and which are nowadays absolutely necessary in mass claim litigation.
-Confidentiality: even without an increased degree of confidentiality 24 , this is certainly an advantage for sophisticated corporations, vis à vis court litigation.
-Speed and finality: As it has been pointed out above, the fact that arbitration awards cannot be appealed but under very limited circumstances makes arbitration quicker than court proceedings, not to speak of overloaded courts. Speed may afford victims the emotional compensation of which they are deprived in cases of incredibly delayed court litigation. It may also provide for a dispute resolution method which is cheaper than litigation. Nevertheless, in some cases, MNCs and their victims may 24 See "limitations on discovery", above.
actually profit more from dilatory tactics than from speed and may thus be more inclined towards traditional court litigation. 
Arbitration or mediation/conciliation? Or both?
The abovementioned advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, with respect to mediation and conciliation, have to be balanced against each other, in order to adopt arbitration or mediation, depending on the type of conflict and the specific HRs violation. Furthermore, traditional key features of ADR, such as voluntariness and neutrality may have to be revised in such a field as HRs, where adjudicators are sometimes not expected to remain neutral but to comply with and enforce certain legal and ethical parameters. Nevertheless, if adjudicators do manifest a proactive attitude, it may deeply damage a system which is based upon confidence and consent (Rycrof, 2002, 287) .
25 Alford, R. P. "Arbitrating Human Rights", Notre Dame Law Review 83, 2007 -2008 violations 26 For instance, the fact that parties do not have to waive their right of access to court litigation and that they are not bound by any final decision or settlement proposal reached during the mediation, would make it more tempting for MNCs to submit to these type of dispute resolution mechanism. In this regard, much may be learnt from the Chinese dispute resolution tradition, which has learnt to effectively combine arbitration and mediation in a single dispute resolution mechanism which has forged a legal and commercial community that avoids confrontation and strives for harmony. On the other hand, mediators who earn their fees on the basis of achieving a settlement between the parties may not have incentives to ensure that justice is done or that, at least, the position of the party who claims to have suffered at the hands of the MNC is sufficiently protected. This danger is bigger when the mediator is poorly trained and cannot anticipate the likely result of adjudicating the case in court litigation.
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Elements could also be taken from Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, especially in so far as these mechanisms may provide victims with the emotional compensation derived from an apology, to a greater extent than in litigation or monitoring procedures.
There is also a real need to alleviate the tension between HRs advocates' post-conflict focus on justice and conflict resolvers' post-conflict desire to promote reconciliation. 28 In this respect, the choice between arbitration and mediation may also depend upon the great question of whether justice and compensation is needed (in addition to forgiveness), in order to resolve HRs conflicts, or whether a mere compromise of interests would be enough.
Finally, there is also a need to strike a balance between (i) having a final decision which holds someone accountable for the violation occurred and is made to pay for it and (ii) the "fund" approach which may provide easier access to compensation for victims but which may leave them without someone to blame and maybe without assurance as to whether the same events will happen again. 29 In this regard, the examples of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund or the Claims Resolution
Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland may provide a useful starting point.
Applicable law
The selection of the applicable law sometimes plays a minor role in arbitration, in comparison to court proceedings, because what is of paramount importance is a thorough analysis of the facts and the achievement of material (as opposed to formal)
justice. Furthermore, in mediation, law may only provide a clearer picture for the parties, in order to calculate the advantages of a settlement, vis á vis future litigation.
Commercial arbitration rules usually point to the law chosen by the parties or to the rules of law which the tribunal determines to be applicable on the basis of freely chosen conflict of laws rules or absolute discretion -the so called voie direct. This flexibility has allowed commercial arbitration tribunals to develop and apply concepts such as "the new Lex Mercatoria" or "General Principles of Law".
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In the same way, the conflict of laws rules or substantive law principles to be applied must be a priori acceptable by both MNCs and potential victims. They would also have to allow arbitration tribunals to draw from the wide array of rules of law for the protection of HRs, labour rights, the environment, indigenous populations, etc.
For instance, codes of conduct could be useful both as the legal instrument where consent to arbitration is to be found and as the instrument where individual victims can find a right of action and/or the applicable legal rules which support their claims. In this regard, arbitral tribunals may decide that the codes of conduct are manifestations of principles accepted in the market worldwide and therefore binding on MNCs. 
The advantages of ad hoc arbitration tribunals vis à vis permanent institutions
The accredited success of arbitration institutions such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal or the CRT may be partly due to the fact that they were created to resolve a specific dispute or set of disputes. The establishment of any kind of truly supranational adjudicatory body, on the other hand, always involves too lengthy procedures and compromises between states or the parties involved. Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed either that, as far as arbitration is concerned, the life-long experience of institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce may account for the raise in the use of arbitration between commercial parties, who rely on such institutions because of their well evidenced success.
Procedural rules
Especially in the case of a permanent institution, the issue of procedural rules is of extreme importance. However, the great majority of arbitration rules issued by institutions such as the ICC, UNCITRAL and ICSID are mainly designed for commercial disputes or, at least, disputes arising out of contractual or investment relationships. On the contrary, arbitration proceedings which effectively provide accountability for damages caused by MNCs should probably be tort-centred, i.e. the cause of action will be for damages not arising out of a contractual relationship. 
Standard of proof
It is well known that arbitration is many times about facts, rather than about law.
Nevertheless, evidentiary issues in commercial and tort cases may be quite different from evidentiary issues in HRs cases, where there may be no reliable records or unbiased witnesses. Furthermore, whereas in ordinary litigation, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, HRs claims may many times take the form of hundreds of very similar claims, a fact that calls for less stringent standards of proof.
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The goal would be to propose standards of proof which respect due process of law and, at the same time, prevent slow and inefficient proceedings. 
Suitable remedies which are acceptable by both parties
There is a need to explore the different kinds of remedies that should be available to victims of HRs violations. The criminal court system places too much emphasis on the punishment of the perpetrator and the prevention of future offenses so that the victim may be forgotten. 34 In this regard, it cannot be assumed that the victim necessarily wants some sort of "revenge". Settlement Systems may prove to be a useful alternative, although many theoretical and practical problems are still to be resolved.
